#### Week N: Interaction Models POLI502

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### **Outline for Today**

#### Interaction models

- Numerical × binary variable
  - Estimation in R
  - Plot
- 2 Numerical × numerical
  - Estimation in R
  - Plot

#### Review: multiple regression

Multiple regression (additive model):

$$\hat{Y} = \alpha + \beta_1 * X + \beta_2 * Z$$

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$$\hat{Y} = \alpha + \beta_1 * X \text{ when } Z=0$$
$$\hat{Y} = (\alpha + \beta_2) + \beta_1 * X \text{ when } Z=1$$

The model allows us to have different intercepts depending on Z, but the slope for X ( $\beta_1$ ) is assumed to be the same.

We may want to relax this assumption.

#### **Conditional hypotheses**

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Instead, we want to have this (interaction model):

$$\hat{Y} = \alpha + \beta_1 * X + \beta_2 * Z + \beta_3 * XZ$$
$$\hat{Y} = \alpha + \beta_1 * X \text{ when } Z=0$$
$$\hat{Y} = (\alpha + \beta_2) + (\beta_1 + \beta_3) * X \text{ when } Z=1$$

Now, both the intercept and the slope are different

In competitive elections, the more money a candidate spends on campaigning, the more votes s/he is expected to get.

- DV: vote share (%) for candidates in the 2009 general election in Japan
- IDV: campaign spending (in 1,000 pounds)



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	Dependent variable:	
	Vote Share	
Campaign Spending	0.530***	
	(0.017)	
Constant	7.735***	
	(0.757)	
Observations	1,124	
R <sup>2</sup>	0.478	
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.478	
Residual Std. Error	16.042 (df = 1122)	
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

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 $\hat{VS} = 7.735 + 0.53 * CS$ 

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- **2** No reverse causality  $Y \Rightarrow X$
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What do you think the causal mechanism is here?

What do you think potential confounders (conditioning factors) are?



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	(1)	(2)
Campaign Spending	0.530***	0.391***
	(0.017)	(0.022)
Incumbent		12.238***
		(1.335)
Constant	7.735***	8.384***
	(0.757)	(0.734)
Observations	1,124	1,124
R <sup>2</sup>	0.478	0.515
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.478	0.514
Residual Std. Error	16.042 (df = 1122)	15.480 (df = 1121)
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VS = 8.384	4 + 0.391 * CS + 1	2.238 * Inc
$\hat{VS} = 8.384$	4 + 0.391 * CS wh	en Z=0 (1)
$\hat{VS} = 20.62$	22 + 0.391 * CS wh	nen Z=1 (2)
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Additive model: different intercept (when z = 0 or 1)

The first model:

$$\hat{VS} = 7.735 + 0.530 * CS$$

The second model:

 $\hat{VS} = 8.384 + 0.391 * CS \text{ for non-incumbents}$  $\hat{VS} = 20.622 + 0.391 * CS \text{ for incumbents}$ 

Δ.

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$$\hat{VS} = 7.735 + 0.530 * CS$$

The second model:

$$\hat{VS} = 8.384 + 0.391 * CS \text{ for non-incumbents}$$
  
$$\hat{VS} = 20.622 + 0.391 * CS \text{ for incumbents}$$

The second model is more flexible.

- the first one is based on an assumption that incumbents and non-incumbents have the same intercept;
- the second one relaxes that assumption.

But the second one is still based on an untested assumption.

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- If the effect of Campaign Spending on Vote Share is *through* increased publicity, the effect could be bigger for non-incumbents
  - Campaign spending may increase vote share in general;

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- If the effect of Campaign Spending on Vote Share is *through* increased publicity, the effect could be bigger for non-incumbents
  - Campaign spending may increase vote share in general;
  - Yet, an additional spending will increase vote share more for non-incumbents;
     An additional spending may have little effect on vote share for incumbents, as they are relatively well known already;

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- If the effect of Campaign Spending on Vote Share is *through* increased publicity, the effect could be bigger for non-incumbents
  - Campaign spending may increase vote share in general;
  - Yet, an additional spending will increase vote share more for non-incumbents;
     An additional spending may have little effect on vote share for incumbents, as they are relatively well known already;
  - $\bullet \; \to$  depending on the incumbency status, not only the intercept but also the slope for spending may differ.

To relax this assumption, we include a **product** of Campaign Spending and Incumbency status:

$$\hat{VS} = lpha + eta_1 * CS + eta_2 * Inc + eta_3 * CS * Inc$$

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• When Inc = 0, the model simplifies to

$$\hat{VS} = \alpha + \beta_1 * CS + \beta_2 * (0) + \beta_3 * CS * (0)$$
$$= \alpha + \beta_1 * CS$$

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• When Inc = 1, the model reduces to

$$\hat{VS} = \alpha + \beta_1 * CS + \beta_2 * (1) + \beta_3 * CS * (1) = \alpha + \beta_1 * CS + \beta_2 + \beta_3 * CS = (\alpha + \beta_2) + (\beta_1 + \beta_3) * CS$$

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(1)	(2)	(-)
	(2)	(3)
0.530 <sup>***</sup> (0.017)	0.391 <sup>***</sup> (0.022)	0.864 <sup>***</sup> (0.026)
	12.238*** (1.335)	46.758*** (1.791)
		-0.866*** (0.036)
7.735 <sup>***</sup> (0.757)	8.384 <sup>***</sup> (0.734)	-1.502** (0.721)
1,124 0.478	1,124 0.515	1,124 0.681
0.478 16.042 (df = 1122)	0.514 15.480 (df = 1121)	0.680 12.548 (df = 1120)
	0.530 (0.017) 7.735*** (0.757) 1,124 0.478 0.478 16.042 (df = 1122)	$\begin{array}{cccc} 0.530^{-1.1} & 0.391^{-1.2} \\ (0.017) & (0.022) \\ 12.238^{***} \\ (1.335) \\ \end{array}$ $\begin{array}{cccc} 7.735^{***} & 8.384^{***} \\ (0.757) & (0.734) \\ \end{array}$ $\begin{array}{cccc} 1,124 & 1,124 \\ 0.478 & 0.515 \\ 0.478 & 0.514 \\ 16.042 & (df = 1122) \\ \end{array}$

Note:

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Campaign Spending	0.530 <sup>***</sup> (0.017)	0.391 <sup>***</sup> (0.022)	0.864 <sup>***</sup> (0.026)
Incumbency		12.238*** (1.335)	46.758*** (1.791)
Campaign Spending $\times$ Incumbency			-0.866*** (0.036)
Constant	7.735 <sup>***</sup> (0.757)	8.384 <sup>***</sup> (0.734)	-1.502 <sup>**</sup> (0.721)
Observations	1,124	1,124	1,124
R <sup>2</sup>	0.478	0.515	0.681
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.478	0.514	0.680
Residual Std. Error	16.042 (df = 1122)	15.480 (df = 1121)	12.548 (df = 1120)

Note:

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

 $\hat{VS} = -1.502 + 0.864 * CS + 46.758 * Inc - 0.866 * CS * Inc$ 

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• When Inc = 0, the model simplifies to

$$\hat{VS} = -1.502 + 0.864 * CS$$

• When Inc = 1, the model simplifies to

$$\hat{VS} = -1.502 + 0.864 * CS + 46.758 - 0.866 * CS$$
  
=  $(-1.502 + 46.758) + (0.864 - 0.866) * CS$   
=  $45.256 - 0.002 * CS$ 

#### Estimation in R

When you want to include an interaction term between  ${\bf x}$  and  ${\bf z},$  you write

 $lm(y \sim x + z + x*z)$ 

(The third term that combines x and z with a colon or asterisk  $(X \star Z)$  is the interaction term.)

Whenever you estimate an interactive model, make sure you interpret the results graphically using the effect function.

plot(effect(term = "x:z", mod = fit))

Or even better, use ggplot to plot the effect plots.



#### exp\*incumbent effect plot



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#### Estimation in R: factor vs numeric

Recall that, when including a binary variable in a regression model, we could do so in one of two ways.

- Include the original factor variable as is
- Include a numerical binary variable

We saw this when dealing with the NorthSouth binary in the Putnam data set:

- Include the original factor variable is necessary to create an effect "plot" (o.w. R will assume it is a numeric variable)
- Include a numerical binary variable is preferable in order to produce an intuitive regression "table"

The same applies here.

#### Example 1: factor vs numeric

#### exp\*incumbent effect plot



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exp\*inc.dum effect plot

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### Splitting the sample

There is another way to obtain a similar regression results, **but you need to be careful about sample size**:

- Split the data into two subsets (incumbents and non-incumbents);
- Regress Vote Share on Campaign Spending on each subset.

### Splitting the sample

There is another way to obtain a similar regression results, **but you need to be careful about sample size**:

- Split the data into two subsets (incumbents and non-incumbents);
- Regress Vote Share on Campaign Spending on each subset.

	(1)	(2)
Campaign Spending	-0.002 (0.023)	0.864*** (0.027)
Constant	45.256*** (1.558)	-1.502** (0.740)
Observations	392	732

Results for Inc = 0

$$\hat{VS} = -1.502 + 0.864 * CS$$

Results for Inc = 1

$$\hat{VS} = 45.256 - 0.002 * CS$$
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• What happens if we (mistakenly) drop  $\beta_2 * Inc...?$ 

(2) Caveat: The numerical results (coefficients) in interaction models can often be misleading; always interpret the results graphically (draw implied regression lines)

- Just because you get a statistically significant coefficient on an interaction term, it does NOT automatically mean that you find a meaningful conditional relationship!  $\rightarrow$  look at the slope/effect size
- Likewise, even if your interaction term is statistically significant, it does NOT mean that your conditional relationship will NOT be substantial!
- (3) Z (modifying variable) does not have to be a binary variable. It can be a continuous variable as well.

#### **Example 2: Female representation**

Let's say we want to test the following hypotheses:

• As the level of ethnic fractionalization increases, female representation goes down.

This relationship may not hold universally;

- The above relationship will not exist in poorer countries;
- The relationship will be stronger in wealthier countries.

To test these hypotheses, we could estimate the following model:

 $lm(women09 \sim frac_eth + gdp_10_thou + frac_eth*gdp_10_thou)$ 

#### **Example 2: Female representation**

Table:

	(1)	(2)
Ethnic Fractionalization	2.406	7.937**
	(3.300)	(3.697)
Per capita GDP	3.610***	6.936***
	(0.880)	(1.390)
Ethnic Fractionalization		-10.177***
imes Per capita GDP		(3.344)
Constant	13.776***	11.275***
	(1.855)	(1.987)
Observations	166	166
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.084	0.128
Residual Std. Error	10.359 (df = 163)	10.106 (df = 162)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

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frac\_eth



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## Final Advice: all interactions are "symmetric"

When you propose a conditional hypothesis/theory, you actually should test this following pair of hypotheses:

- *H*<sub>X|Z</sub>: The marginal effect of X on Y is positive at all values of Z; this effect is strongest when Z is at its lowest and declines in magnitude as Z increases.
- H<sub>Z|X</sub>: The marginal effect of Z on Y is positive at all values of X; this effect is strongest when X is at its lowest and declines in magnitude as X increases.